"Expensive Living: The Greek Experience under the Euro" by Taun N. Toay & Theodore Pelagidis
Working Paper No.  484






*Corresponding author. University of Piraeus, 40 Karaoli and Dimitriou Street,
18532 Piraeus, Greece, Tel./Fax+30-210-7216033. Email: pelagidi@unipi.gr
**University of Piraeus affiliated Fulbright Grantee, 2005–2006, The Fulbright
Foundation, 6 Vas. Sophias Avenue, 10674 Athens, Greece, Email:
Tauntoay05@fulbrightweb.org
We thank Y. Stournaras and P. Kazakos for their helpful comments and
suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection presents research in progress by
Levy Institute scholars and conference participants. The purpose of the series is to
disseminate ideas to and elicit comments from academics and professionals.
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is a nonprofit,
nonpartisan, independently funded research organization devoted to public service.
Through scholarship and economic research it generates viable, effective public policy
responses to important economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in
the United States and abroad.








Apart from its widely accepted direct advantages, the introduction of the euro has been 
accompanied by a surge of inflation in most of the EU member states. At the same time, 
wages—in part, wages of the unskilled—are relatively losing ground, while the purchasing 
power of the average European seems also to have weakened since the introduction of the single 
currency. In this paper we deal with five relevant central issues to interpret “expensiveness” in 
Greece. First, we examine to what extent recent inflation trends are attributable to the constraints 
imposed by the monetary union—namely negative demand disturbances in certain Greek 
regions. Second, we investigate to what extent these patterns are also due to the adoption of the 
euro—including conversion period effects—over product market and other domestic rigidities. 
Third, we investigate the impact of seasonal effects on inflation, in the context of the Greek so-
called traditional “petit-bourgeois capitalism.” Fourth, we explore the extent to which 
unemployment is another factor that drives wages and purchasing power down. Fifth, we apply 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect to see whether it constitutes the culprit for price hikes in 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is one phrase on the lips of Europeans today more than any other, “life is getting too 
expensive.” Whether at the market, paying rent, or traveling, Europeans pain over recent prices 
and often attribute the cause to the adoption of the euro. No matter what language you speak, 
Europeans increasingly cringe at prices under the euro—support for which has eroded from the 
time of its introduction. A growing divide is apparent in Europe between the proposed benefits of 
monetary union and the public discontent surrounding reforms that accompany it.  
  Greece is aptly the center of this fissure, caught between integration and a society 
uncomfortable with the recent pace of change. In particular, although the majority of Greeks 
remain proponents of European Union (EU) widening and deepening, public disappointment 
over the euro is increasingly prevalent. Previously, Greece witnessed a hard push for inclusion in 
the European Monetary Union (EMU), both from policy-makers and its citizens. Now, Greece is 
among the nations most opposed to the euro. The most recent Eurobarometer survey finds only 
49% of Greeks in favor of the European Monetary Union, versus the 59% average for the EU. 
The figures are more divergent when comparing opinion against the EMU, where Greece boasts 
the second highest percentage against the EMU (England: 64%; Greece: 49%; EU average: 
35%). These figures are a far cry from the 62% of Greeks that favored EMU membership in 
previous surveys (EKEM 2005). Such a rapid shift in sentiment warrants exploration.  
  The European Commission (EC) retorts that the overall effect of changeover on prices 
was limited, with the “all items” category of the “Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices” falling 
between 0.12 to 0.29%—depending on the country (EC 2005). In fact, the overall Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) rose cumulatively only by 20.1% over the six-year period of 2000 to 2005 
(NSSG 2005). Many people are quick to attribute this seemingly stark figure to the adoption of 
the euro—understandably, as the entrance of Greece into the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) and later into the eurozone nicely overlays to this time period. Overlooked, 
however, is the same comparison for the six years preceding 2000. The cumulative inflation of 
1994 through 1999 was 40.9%. Far more staggering is the comparison to the six years preceding 
1994 (an astonishing 97.4%). In short, recent levels of inflation in Greece pale in comparison to 
previous chapters of Greek history (see Figure I).    2
  However, the real concern is not the overall inflation rate. It is often argued that the 
harmonized inflation index disguises enormous price hikes. Most observers acknowledge that the 
changeover to the euro precipitated price increases in certain sectors and for specific goods and 
services in everyday consumption items such as coffee, vegetables, bread, newspapers, a haircut, 
local taxes (including parking meters), and so on (European Parliament 2005). These price hikes 
are regularly matched with “slow growth” or even stagnated wages for the unskilled labor in 
particular (see Table 1 for minimum wages), a possible consequence of increasing open labor 
markets, trade globalization, and an increasing pool of supply of ready-to-work labor, mainly due 
to high rates of unemployment. 
 
Table 1 
Minimum Statutory Wages and Salaries 
                   Minimum daily wage of         Minimum monthly salary  Minimum monthly salary 
      of blue collars (grc)*       of white collars (grc)*               average for Eurozone** 
2000 20,7  461,5  848,6 
2001 21,1  469,7  890,0 
2002 22,2  494,8  923,0 
2003 23,3  519,9  951,6 
2004 24,5  547,6  979,8 
2005 25,9  579,0  1019,6 
Sources:   *Bank of Greece and General Statistical Service of Greece 
              ** Eurostat 2005–averages are for the eurozone nations with a minimum wage: Belgium, France, Greece,   
                   Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.   
 
 Figure I 
































































  This paper aims to explore whether or not the common perception among Greeks that the 
euro has been the primary cause of recent price hikes is sound. Below we deal with five relevant 
central explanations to approach the issue. First, we examine the extent to which any recent 
inflation trends are attributable to the constraints imposed by monetary union and the single 
currency, namely negative demand disturbances in certain Greek regions. Second, we question to 
what extent these patterns are also due to the adoption of the euro—including conversion period 
issues—versus domestic product market rigidities. Third, we investigate the impact of strong 
seasonal effects on inflation, in the context of the Greek so-called traditional “petit bourgeois 
capitalism” that still survives despite some Europeanization of the economy. Fourth, we explore 
the extent to which unemployment is another factor that drives wages and purchasing power 
down. Last, but not least, we apply the Balassa-Samuelson effect to see whether it constitutes the 
culprit for non-tradable products price hikes.  
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2. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREAS AND 
“EXPENSIVENESS” 
 
In theory, monetary union entails a host of positives for the countries concerned. Most 
importantly, the single currency promotes trade by reducing uncertainty over interest and 
exchange rates, and by eliminating transaction costs and red tape by the banks. In addition, a 
single currency provides better access to markets for European enterprises, both within the 
European Union and outside of it, thus helping to improve their competitiveness—again, 
theoretically, as the opposite has been observed in Greece. It also should benefit consumers by 
increasing price transparency and competition. These benefits of the single currency were 
thought to be potent enough to boost growth for the European economies. Reality, however, 
turned out quite differently. 
  The main criticisms against the single currency originate from the theory of “Optimal 
Currency Area” (OCA), which argues against a common monetary policy (Pelagidis 1996a, 
1997). The basic premise is that the mobility of factors of production is a fundamental 
requirement for a successful currency area. This would inject sufficient flexibility in the system 
to hedge against asymmetric demand shocks. Truthfully, however, the mobility of labor remains 
at low levels across Europe—not to mention the absence of a uniform and timely transfer 
payment system (Pelagidis 1996b). This makes adjustment in response to exogenous shocks 
slow, incomplete, and asymmetric, leading to considerable output and employment losses for 
certain regions and sectors under a one-size-fits-all monetary policy.  
  In particular, the incidence and magnitude of aforementioned demand disturbances 
ultimately depends on the output mix and degree of specialization across countries and regions. 
This, in turn, tends to undermine the OCA. The EMU in itself tends to create convergence but, at 
the same time, it also tends to deepen market integration. This increases the degree of sector 
specialization and reinforces differences in the structure of production. The greater the 
differences in the structure of production, the greater the incidence and magnitude of demand 
shocks on individual countries and regions will be. Thus, the lower the respective speed of 
adjustment will tend to be. The rigidity of labor and product markets only aggravates the 
problem.   5
  Within the EU there are marked differences in the structure of production. Germany and 
France, for instance, have relatively large manufacturing sectors. Conversely, the manufacturing 
sectors of Greece and Portugal are very small, accounting for equally small employment ratios. 
One wouldn’t expect a demand shock to affect these countries the same.  
  Differences in the composition of output from one country to another means that terms of 
trade shocks affect countries differently. Hence, loss of domestic control over monetary policy 
tends to make macroeconomic shocks more asymmetric (McKinnon 2000). In fact, empirical 
evidence shows that the core EU countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark) 
experience very different supply shocks from those affecting other member countries, including 
the U.K., Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece (Eichengreen 1997), meaning the EU-15 
alone is prone to asymmetric shocks. Extending analysis to countries as economically diverse in 
their composition as the EU-25 leaves policy-makers with a group of nations that are anything 
but homogeneous. 
  Within the EMU, monetary policy is entirely in the hands of the ECB and outside the 
control of national monetary authorities. Hence, an adverse demand shock is expected to have a 
heterogeneous impact on member states and regions. The heterogeneous impact will be more 
pronounced as economic integration promotes specialization and the deepening of production.  
  The internal cost of adjustment will depend on the size and incidence of asymmetric 
shocks and on the efficacy of alternative adjustment mechanisms, namely labor markets and 
fiscal policies. That is, the country affected must deflate internally, which means that wages 
should lag inflation to prevent a loss of competitiveness. On the other hand, the corresponding 
required fiscal contraction raises regional unemployment and, as a consequence, the supply of 
the unemployed and unskilled in the labor market. Thus, overall wages stagnate for the 
“unprivileged” sectors and regions; while on the opposite end of the spectrum, the winners 
concentrate wealth, demanding superior, modern products and services. At this point—despite 
greater theorized market efficiency—the introduction of euro creates favorable conditions for 
growing inequalities in incomes and eroding standards of living. In other words, winners (agents 
and regions) see their purchasing power increasing, while losers (other regions and mainly poor, 
unskilled labor and low-income pensioners) see their wages stagnating, experiencing higher 
prices even for some basic—albeit highly demanded—goods and services. As Greece’s structure   6
of production, employment, and its general division of labor is quite different from the EU 
average (due to the relatively high share of GDP stemming from the agricultural and petit-
professional sectors), any demand shocks in the European economy are likely experienced in 
Greece as both asymmetric and negative, with catastrophic results for the Greek purchasing 
power.  
  We will go further and examine the above argument in context of the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect in section six. First, however, we must discuss another channel with which the euro and its 
“asymmetrical consequences” might contribute to the “expensive living” in Greece, namely 
product market rigidities that allow price abuses to flourish. 
 
3. CONVERSION PERIOD AND DOMESTIC PRODUCT MARKET RIGIDITIES 
 
While the terms of entry and constraints of the eurozone could be argued to place upward 
pressure on prices, the changeover period is where attention should focus. It is clear that there 
was some rounding up in the conversion process to the euro. While the official conversion rate 
was enforced at the exchange and banking level, new prices for goods and services were left to 
providers—offering a convenient opportunity to price gouge.  
  Beyond the sectors that could claim menu-cost pricing strategies, many of the less formal 
markets draw the greatest complaints for price hikes. Unfortunately, due to the discretion 
exercised by sellers and the lack of consistency in such informal markets, these same areas are 
very difficult for economists and statisticians to accurately track (prices of goods bought at the 
laiki, or open-air market, for example). The range of price level changes is staggering, with some 
consumer groups claiming 20 to 147% increases in the price of certain goods since 2002 [Greek 
Consumer Centre (ELKEKA) 2006]. Again, despite complaints over prices, there was not a 
sharp overall spike in prices at the time of conversion. That said, many trends are overshadowed 
when looking at the economy as a whole.  
  It should be noted that countries with more complex conversion rates witnessed higher 
inflation during changeover than those nations with easily calculated rates. The conversion 
period in these countries, Greece included, created an information asymmetry between buyers 
and sellers. This mismatch in available information—or discrepancy in the cost of gathering accurate information—allowed a price wedge to be driven between the buyers and the market 
clearing rates (Ehrmann 2006), meaning the cost of converting many prices for many purchases 
was higher for buyers in countries with complex exchange rates to the euro. While marginal on 
aggregate, these changeover inflationary effects were especially pronounced in low priced 
goods—an asymmetry to which we will return. Equally pronounced, as Table 2 shows, was the 
inflation acceleration in services.  
 
 
  Table 2 
 
      March 2002           March 2003
Prices determined by the State 
Water/Sewage        3,1%      4,1% 
Electricity        4,4%      3,9% 
Medical  services        4,9%      5,7% 
Hospital  stays        4,5%      4,4% 
Hotel  expenditures     12,7%      5,3% 
Airline  tickets      12,2%      0,0%   
Taxi  fares        0,0%      8,0%   
Ferry  tickets        6,1%    26,9%   
Tuition  fees        3,6%      4,5%   
 
Prices determined by the market 
Take-away  food        6,7%      3,8%   
Books  and  Newspapers       3,7%      4,0%   
Served  beverages        8,4%      5,0%   
H a i r c u t s        1 1 , 0 %       7 , 9 %  
Car  services        3,2%      7,2% 
 
Source: Alpha Bank (2003), Economic Bulletin No 86. 
  7  In particular, several goods and services in the Consumer Price Index stand out for 
accelerated inflation in the years surrounding changeover to the euro (see Table 3). “Food and 
non-alcoholic beverages” along with “hotels, cafés, and restaurants” witnessed inflation rates of 
5.1% and 4.6% for 2001, respectively, and 5.3% and 6.7% for 2002. Such figures are well above 
the economy’s average rate of 3.4% for 2001 and 3.6% for 2002. More pronounced was the 
acceleration in “alcoholic beverages and tobacco,” which soared 7.6% higher for 2001 and 7.2% 
higher for the following year. This is in sharp contrast to a category such as “transport,” which 
boasted rates of 1.1% for 2001 and 0.9% for 2002 (NSSG 2006a). While these accelerations in 
prices for certain categories correspond to the adoption of the euro, one should be careful in 
saying the new currency caused these trends. It is, however, reasonable to say that the areas 
marked by more rapid inflation surrounding the adoption of the euro had a high degree of 




CPI Sub-indices Inflation (%) 
 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004
 
General Index        3,2   3,4   3,6   3,5   2,9 
Food-Beverages        1,9   5,1   5,3   5,0   0,5 
Alcohol/Tobacco       2,8   7,6   7,2   4,2   4,6 
Garment-Footwear       2,1   3,3   3,6   2,0   4,1 
Housing         6,1   1,8   3,3   4,4   4,8 
Durable goods         1,0   2,3   1,6   2,0   1,6 
Health           3,3   2,9   4,7   4,3   4,6 
Transportation          6,4   1,1   0,8   3,0   3,5 
Telecommunications       -10,5  -0,8 -4,6 -4,2 -4,3 
Leisure and recreation       1,3   3,5   3,3   2,9   2,8 
Education         3,2   3,6   3,9   4,5   4,4 
Hotels, cafes & Restaurants    4,7   4,6   6,7   4,8   4,2  
Other goods and services      2,2   4,9   3,6   3,2   2,2 
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  While it is clear that there was a mix of accelerated inflation for certain goods and 
services surrounding the adoption of the euro (Alpha Bank 2003), those same years where 
marked by historically low inflation rates for Greece (recall Figure I). How, then, can we explain 
the prevalence of the view that the euro has caused higher prices? The answer lies, as we will 
argue below, to a great extent, in product market rigidities, which institutionalize any temporary 
effects such as the conversion one-off changeover.  
  Truth be told, inflation remains problematic in Greece today for many of the same 
reasons it was troublesome in the past. Strong unions, especially in public sectors, successfully 
demand wage hikes beyond levels that productivity gains would otherwise dictate (McDonald 
2005). Furthermore, restrictions on hiring and firing employees drive up the cost of a company 
taking on new workers. Such costs are easily passed onto the consumer in Greece due to fairly 
uncompetitive markets. The lack of open markets and excessive regulation further impede 
competition from driving down prices. It should be pointed out here that Greece’s economy is 
the least “trade open” among the EU member-states, with trade only 15% of GDP (openness 
index) (NCCD 2006). That makes the life of domestic monopolies much easier, as competition 
from abroad is rather restricted, but on the other hand it accelerates prices at the expense of 
consumer’s welfare. It worth mentioning that, according to Eurostat and National Bank of 
Greece estimations (National Bank of Greece 2005), the “core inflation” (prices of fuel and fresh 
fruits and vegetables excluded) in Greece is around 3.0%, the highest by far in the EU (average 
1.6%). Where fuel and vegetables are generally the main culprits for inflation volatility, in 
Greece, price hikes seem to result mostly from the malfunction of the product markets and, to a 
lesser extent, to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, as standard macroeconomics would suggest.     
  Let us first embark on the issue of the uncompetitive markets and excessive regulation. In 
fact, the two impetuses are closely connected. Stagnation in Europe is often largely attributed to 
labor market rigidities; namely, too high unemployment benefits, too high minimum wage levels, 
and too high a degree of worker protection. Overlooked in these factors are the oligopolistic 
structure of certain markets and the strong and inefficient presence of the state. To stress an 
important point—focusing on labor rigidities alone misses a large explanation of inflation owed 
to product and service rigidities. Table 4 lists indices that capture the level of regulation on two 
professions for various EU countries. A certain level of regulation can be viewed as necessary to protect consumers. Nevertheless, at high levels, regulation becomes a deterrent for new market 
entries, allowing insiders to drive up prices and offering little incentive for improving services or 
productivity performance. Notice the correlation between less regulated countries and 
employment, with Finland, Sweden, and the U.K. each displacing comparatively low regulations 
versus the stagnate economies of “old Europe.” Furthermore, while Greece displaces strong 
growth rates, it also boasts very high levels of unemployment. Although not extensive for 






Composition of Regulation Indices 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Lawyers        Notaries Public*                 
Austria          7.3       5.0 
Belgium             4.6       4.3 
Denmark        3.0        -- 
Finland            0.3         -- 
France          6.6       4.8 
Germany        6.5       5.0 
Greece          9.5       4.8 
Ireland          4.5        -- 
Italy          6.4       4.3 
Luxembourg        6.6       4.6 
Netherlands        3.9       3.8 
Portugal         5.7       3.9 
Spain          6.5       4.0 
Sweden         2.4        -- 
U.K. / E & W Barristers      4.6         -- 
U.K.          3.5         -- 
 
  *Arithmetic mean of market entry regulation indices. 
Source: Paterson I. et al (2003), “Economic Impact of Regulation in 
the Field of Liberal Professions in Different Member States,” Final 
















  Figure 2 shows the negative externality of such excessive regulation on economic 
activity. While Greece displayed an improvement from 1998 to 2003, it still ranks worse than 
any other EU-15 nation. In addition, Figure 3 places Greece at the top of discriminatory 
procedures, a strong impetus to competitive market function. An interesting observation is the 
improvement made for restrictive regulation impacting economic behavior versus no gains in 
discriminatory procedures. One possible explanation is that restrictions have not eased; rather, 
strong growth in Greece and the investment preceding the Olympic Games in 2004 offset the otherwise negative impact on behavior. The figures should raise alarm for policy-makers. 
Unfortunately, the degree of regulation and discriminatory procedures is both a cause and 
product of the state occasionally serving clientelistic pressures (Kazakos 2001). Regulation 
creates insiders who are then better leveraged to influence liberalization—or lack thereof—in 












  In conclusion, government regulation should focus on fighting firms’ rent-seeking 
behavior that is directly linked with product market rigidities and “entry to the market” 
restrictions. Such restrictions are the direct result of the influence of special interests in 
entrepreneurial activities and professions that exercise pressures to keep significant parts of 
product and service markets under oligopolistic controls, favoring price increases which reduce 
consumer welfare and purchasing power. Thus, the government concern should revolve around 
regulating price abuses and freeing up product and service (professional) markets. Seemingly, 
one way to facilitate this is to ease regulation on professions and the hiring burdens of 
companies. Again, markets more open to competition through lowering barriers to entry will 
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4. STRONG SEASONAL EFFECTS AND OTHER DOMESTIC ISSUES 
 
While the euro fostered information asymmetry during conversion—and, consequently, price 
gouging—it also allowed for the exacerbation of a pattern we term the “Pasha Effect.”
∗ The 
“Pasha Effect” refers to price discrimination surrounding traditions. The implications of this 
effect are found during periods in which producer’s price gouge certain products favored by 
traditions. The application to Greece revolves around religion’s role in society and seasonal 
consumption patterns dictated by a Mediterranean diet—as opposed to high consumption levels 
of processed foods. In effect, Greek consumers are almost always subject to some “seasonal 
effect,” with the tradition of shopping at the laiki for fresh produce or dietary restrictions for 
Easter and Christmas. This “Pasha Effect,” along with often unfavorable weather conditions that 
hurt perishable vegetables and fresh products, allows price hikes to precede demand and supply 
movements, given the changing nature of consumer demand elasticity over periods of tradition-
constrained consumption patterns. While not necessary unique to Greece, the “Effect” is likely 
observable in any society where tradition has a strong influence on free-market mechanisms. 
Although the folly of this effect lies in rigid product market where producers can easily exploit 
periods of inelastic demand allowing for price discrimination, the conversion to the euro likely 
allowed the Pasha Effect to appear less pronounced—lost in conversion, if you will. The fact that 
the “Effect” has continued long after the conversion to the euro indicates a lack of free market 
forces in Greece. 
  While a great deal of explaining the euro’s perceived contribution to inflation revolves 
around socioeconomic trends—namely, that more people are feeling greater burdens from 
inflation compared to previous generations—mention should be given to psychological forces. 
Psychology plays a strong role in the perceptions of prices, as people factor the smaller everyday 
costs—such as coffee and parsley—more readily than the rare purchases, on behalf of the 
 
∗ “Pasha” (Easter) refers to Orthodox Easter in Greece, prior to which a 40-day fasting period takes place. There are fairly strict 
dietary guidelines over this period, with notable increased consumption of vegetables and certain seafood and, following Easter, 
lamb. Other similar—although shorter—periods contributing to price run-ups in certain goods and services exist. Other notable 
“special food periods” that prohibit or favor the consumption of certain foods and products are the “first day of lent,” the 15
th of 
August (Assumption), the 1
st of May (Labor Day), Christmas, and New Year’s Day, and last but not least, the Sunday-Pasha. 
During summertime holidays in August, the price of ferry and other transportation tickets are also accelerating very fast due to a 
huge domestic and international seasonal demand for traveling to the islands.      14
unprivileged in particular, of computers and cars, or the interest rates savings they have on a 
home loan. 
   This divergence between perceived inflation and actual inflation is partially attributable 
to relating successions of price hikes to a single event. Some limited panel research for 
restaurants in Italy has found much of the inflation coming before the official euro-changeover. 
The perception of prices doubling is often relating several years to the conversion date and 
deemed so large due to the number of price revisions (Gaiotti and Lippi 2004). 
  The importance of these trends and their impact on public perception is that they are 
often strictly attributed to the euro. As we argued before, it is true that the euro created a 
conversion price shock and this period was plagued with “price discrimination” that extended 
beyond the changeover period. Furthermore, the continued “seasonal effects” in their different 
forms in Greece have likely had a real impact on inflation; however, “conversion,” as well as 
“seasonal,” impacts became extended well beyond conversion and entrenched price hikes due to 
producers’ power and were fuelled by rigid product markets. It follows that higher prices and 
eroded purchasing power help explain the strong public discontent over the euro, as many people 
believe that the single currency is the culprit. Nonetheless, apt blame for recent price trends 
should, as we argue, focus more on structural forces that perpetuate inflation.   
 
5. THE UNPRIVILEGED UNEMPLOYED  
 
By looking at purchasing power relative to other European nations, Greece lacks rapid real 
convergence (OECD 2005a), meaning Greece has not created a much higher standard of living 
for its citizens—especially for the unemployed and underemployed—since joining the European 
Union, despite structural fund transfers. Those socially marginalized in the integration process 
are especially prone to populist rhetoric and scapegoating the euro for stagnated wages and high 
rates of unemployment.  
  Standard of living indices often look at purchasing power levels over a period of time. In 
the past, money in Greece rapidly lost value, but was offset by large wage increases—fuelling 
the inflation cycle of higher prices, higher wages, and so on. Today, inflation has been 
dramatically reduced, but so, too, has wage growth. Further, while wage hikes continue to   15
outpace inflation overall, wage growth in lower income jobs is often below the appropriate 
inflation rate for these income groups (Bank of Greece 2004), as the unskilled labor supply has 
massively increased from the one million unskilled immigrants that entered the country the last 
decade or so. These trends, coupled with already highly entrenched unemployment, leave more 
people feeling greater impacts from price hikes. 
  Unemployment, with some interplay from trade and labor globalization (Chortareas and 
Pelagidis 2004), is certainly one of the factors exerting downward pressure on wages. Greece 
only trails Germany in overall unemployment, at 9.7%, and long-term unemployment, at 5.2% 
(Kathimerini 2006). These stubbornly high rates of unemployment exacerbate the burdens of 
inflation for different segments of the population. Greece boasts the eurozone’s highest percent 
of unemployed individuals under 25 years old, at an unsettling 25%. For the ages 25 to 29, the 
unemployment rate is 16%. Unemployment for women is also shockingly high, with an 
astonishing 27% of those between 15 and 29 unemployed. One would expect these groups to be 
the demographics driving growth. The problem is not constrained to new job seekers either. For 
women between 30 and 44, the figure is 14.9% (NSSG 2006b). Such stark figures indicate a 
large mismatch between skills and available jobs. Compare this environment to 1981, when 





2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 10.9%   10.4%   11.0%   10.4%   9.8% 
Source: Alpha Bank (2006), “The Greek Economy,” Short-term Economic and Financial Outlook, No. 56, June. 
   16
  Furthermore, it is not only that jobs are more difficult to acquire, but also that the pay 
scale is low by recent standards due to trade globalization and immigration further increasing 
labor supply in the domestic markets. Minimum wage in Greece is little over half of the average 
of other euro nations (recall Table 1), with Greeks claiming 668 euros a month, compared to the 
average 1019,6 euros and a far cry from the U.K. or Luxembourg levels: 1244 and 1467 euros a 
month, respectively (Eurostat 2006; Regnard 2005). Equally troubling is that to obtain the same 
goods, an average Greek must work 92% more than an average German worker by some 
measures. 
  Research at the Bank of Greece recently looked at the effects of inflation on different 
income groups in Greece (Mitrakos and Zografakis 2005). Underlying the report are the different 
consumption patterns that separate socioeconomic groups display. Naturally, a low-income 
individual will devote a greater percentage of his or her income to primary products, such as 
fruits, vegetables, and other foods. The same individual will spend less on other areas of the CPI, 
such as entertainment, leisure, and restaurants. It follows that the unemployed, pensioners, 
farmers, and the poor are particularly sensitive to inflation in Greece. Furthermore, over most of 
the period of examination, these groups faced inflation well above the average rate.  
  These trends contribute to a negative perception of the euro in general. As we argued, 
those most burdened by inflation have been, until very recently, a rather growing segment of the 
population. Greece has witnessed many of the changes that follow Western Europe: weakened 
labor rights, high unemployment, constrained state spending, and so on. Still, the nation has yet 
to reap the income gains of a country like Ireland, which joined the EU after Greece and now 
enjoys a living standard higher than the EU average. 
 
6. THE BALASSA-SAMUELSON EFFECT 
 
Greece today is still less developed than other eurozone countries. At the same time, it shows 
greater rates of growth and, simultaneously, higher rates of inflation than other member states. 
Consequently, it is worth studying whether Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect can be applied to 
Greece in explaining the relatively higher rate of inflation and, as a consequence, of 
“expensiveness.”    In accordance with B-S theory, Greece’s tradable sector, in the common market context, 
is facing the pressure of competition and, as a consequence, its productivity is rising. The 
resulting increase in exports drive the tradable sector’s wages up. This wage increase is not 
inflationary, as productivity follows equally and offsets inflationary pressure within the sector. 
However, higher wages are spent on both tradable and non-tradable products (services) that are 
not facing international competition. A typical example of such services is hairdressers. In 
accordance with the B-S effect, although productivity in not enhanced in hairdressing and as the 
increased demand in not counterbalanced by a rise in quantity or quality of the offered service, 
the result is higher priced hairdressers.  
  In the case that the B-S effect holds for Greece, one must first demonstrate that inflation 
pressures are solely derived from the sectors of the economy which produce non-tradable goods. 
However, in both the tradables and non-tradables sectors there do not appear to be other relative 
price reductions, with the exception of telecommunications, in which free-market competition 
prevailed. It is also noted that divergence is observed between Greek and eurozone inflation rates 





























































































Greece, Goods, annual % change, EUROSTAT.
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  A second reason that the B-S effect can only offer a partial explanation of recent Greek 
inflation is that a significant increase in income flows from abroad is missing, as tradable 
sector’s exports rather stagnated [10% of GDP in 2000, 7.5% of GDP in 2004, although their 
average annual increase during the period of 2001 through 2005 was only around 2.3%, 
excluding oil (National Statistical Service of Greece 2006a)]. For the B-S effect to hold in 
Greece’s case, there should have been a well-observed increase in exports due to higher domestic 
productivity. Although we are witnessing an increase in FDI for the 10 new member-states, 
Greece is an exception to this tendency. In both categories—exports and FDIs—what is missing 
for Greece is a significant increase in receipts and inflows that are of such a magnitude that it 
would justify a typical (100%) Balassa-Samuelson effect.  
  On the other hand, as previously mentioned, there are important inflows from the EU in 
the form of structural funds, as well as Common Agricultural Policy funds, which in total come 
to about 3% of the GDP, substituting to an extent for the missing FDIs. This is perfectly 
illustrative of what we refer to as a “quasi B-S effect.”  
  EU funds are, in truth, enough to increase domestic demand significantly and, 
consequently, prices of non-tradable services that avoid—by definition—the competitive 
pressures of open markets. An expansionary fiscal policy that revolves around the Maastricht 
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limit of 3% of GDP according to the methods used to measure deficits also contributes to 
increasing domestic demand and favors further price hikes. To the same direction, inflows from 
the huge (around 30% of the official GDP) “shadow” economy contribute to “expensiveness” 
through massively increasing demand for certain products and mainly non-tradable services that 
show weak increases in productivity rates. 
  A third cause for constraint in fully attributing Greek trends to B-S theory is the lack of a 
significant rise in productivity of certain sectors of the economy, such as tourism and 
transportation, that generate income from abroad. However, the impact of both EU structural 
funds and the expansionary fiscal policy may reflect some general increases in domestic 
productivity of around 2% annually. It has to be noted that these increases are only superficially 
in accordance with the B-S effect, as EU structural fund transfers and fiscal expansion—not 
effective resource allocation—increase in GDP and, subsequently, artificially increase the 
productivity rate (GDP/person).  
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Greeks’ disappointment and frustration over the euro is understandable. It is clear that Greece is 
a more expensive place to live after the euro. Gone is the drachma, and with it, a certain sense of 
national autonomy. The euro is the embodiment of the changes for Greek society, changes that 
have left many losers. Labor disputes have entered a new realm of desperation, where unions are 
torn between honoring their constituents and ceding some of the inevitable concessions in a 
globalizing world. In addition, the notion of European integration as the road to higher standards 
of living has not come to bare fruit for the majority of Greeks. 
  In this paper we dealt with five relevant central issues to approach inflation in Greece. 
First, we examined the extent to which recent inflation trends are attributable to the constraints 
imposed by monetary union and the single currency, namely negative demand disturbances in 
certain Greek regions. Second, we investigated to what extent these patterns are also due to the 
adoption of the euro—including conversion period issues—over domestic rigidities such as strict 
product market regulations. Third, we investigated the impact of strong seasonal effects on 
inflation, in the context of the Greek so-called traditional quasi-capitalism that still survives 
despite some modernization of the economy. Fourth, we explored the extent to which   20
unemployment is another factor that drives wages down. Last, but not least, we applied the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect in order to assess the theory’s explanatory power for higher prices—in 
particular of non-tradable services.  
  We found that all the aforementioned factors play a role, although of different weights. 
Asymmetric disturbances contribute mainly to the phenomenon of both high prices and 
stagnating wages, especially for labor and regions hit by negative demand shocks. As expected, 
some “expensiveness,” especially concerning non-tradable services, is also attributed to the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect. However, the greater part of “expensive living” is argued to be a 
result of domestic issues, such as strong seasonal effects and product markets rigidities. We 
considered the latter as the most important factor. Henceforth, we argued that freeing companies 
from excessive regulations while monitoring price abuses would go far in breaking the 
oligopolistic nature of many Greek industries. By opening markets to competition while easing 
hiring burdens, the government can help stimulate formal economic activity, create jobs, support 
wages, and drive down artificially high prices.  
  Membership in the EMU carries with it an acknowledgment of stability, both political 
and economic. This perceived stability is vital in drawing foreign and domestic investment 
funds, furthering growth, and encouraging employment. Moreover, it is expected that further 
European integration should create price convergence and ease inflation pressures as transaction 
costs are reduced and nations converge. Herein lies a major shortcoming in the expected gains 
from widening and deepening, especially in the case of Greece.  
  In conclusion, the solutions to the entrenched issue of domestic “structural 
expensiveness” would not come through scapegoating the euro or the EU. Rather, by 
implementing structural reforms that will benefit both economic effectiveness and social 
cohesion, while tailoring policies to mitigate the losses of those marginalized by Europeanization 
and globalization, real reform can be achieved. The single currency provides a convenient 
“cause” for the domestic structural inefficiencies encouraging inflation in Greece. In the end, as 
much as Greece’s future lies in the EU, the solutions to the present lie at home.   21
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